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' ' Cl rt., '":t,;::>r:,rno Court, Utah 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
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ROMNEY AND NELSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA BRIDGE and JOSEPH L. 
BRIDGE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LeGRAND P. BACKMAN, MILTON V. 
BACKMAN and HARLAN W. 
CLARK, dlbl a Backman, Backman 
& Clark, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9197 
PETITION OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
FOR RE-HEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
. Defendants and Respondents LeGrand P! Ba~ an, 
• YC~ \?.'1...(. «~,/)~.-• Milton V. Backman and Harlan W. Clark, , re-:l 
quest a re-hearing in the above entitled cause upon the 
following grounds: 
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I 
The Court erred in finding and determining that ap-
pellants alleged a valid agreement by respondents to perfect 
an appeal. 
II 
The Court erred in finding and determining that 
respondents did not show as a matter of law that appellants 
could not have recovered had an appeal been perfected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON, 
Attorneys for respondents. 
I, George L. Nelson, of the firm of Romney & Nelson, 
do hereby certify that the firm of Romney & Nelson are at-
torneys for respondents, petitioners in the above entitled 
action, and that I am a member of said firm; that I have 
carefully examined the decision herein and in my opinion 
there is good reason to believe that the judgment is errone-
ous and should be re-examined. 
Is/ GEORGE L. NELSON 
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THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETER-
MINING THAT APPELLANTS ALLEGED A VALID 
AGREEMENT WITH RESPONDENTS TO PERFECT AN 
APPEAL. 
The decision as rendered as to this point is against the 
law of contracts. 
Appellants do not allege an agreement but allege by 
paragraph 2 of their amended complaint "on or about the 
21st day of May, 1954, the plaintiffs herein, and defendant 
in said contest action, went to the office of the defendants, 
Backman, Backman & Clark, and then and there entered into 
a verbal agreement with the said defendants and particularly 
LeGrand P. Backman to appeal the aforesaid judgment xxx; 
that plaintiffs informed the said defendant that they did 
not have the cash to pay for attorney's fee on appeal and 
asked defendant, LeGrand P. Backman if he would take the 
matter on appeal for a percentage of the recovery, which 
said defendant agreed to do, informing plaintiffs that the 
usual fee was 1/3 of the recovery, but that he would not 
charge plaintiffs that much, but would charge them a fair 
fee, which plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, LeGrand 
P. Backman agreed to receive for his services in making the 
appeal for himself and for his said firm, the other defend-
ants herein; that said defendant, LeGrand P. Backman in-
formed the plaintiffs that they would have to pay approxi-
mately $100 for the cost of printing briefs on appeal, but 
did not ask for said sum to be advanced then and there xxxx." 
That allegation does not set forth a formal agreement, 
it is nothing but a recital of a conversation which might have 
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led to an agreement, the statement that appellants and re-
spondents entered into an oral agreement is nothing but a 
bare legal conclusion. The fact that appellants allege they 
entered into an oral agreement does not make an agree-
ment even in summary judgment proceedings. 
It is evident that the parties, even if the allegations of 
the complaint are accepted as true, were to form an agree-
ment oral or written which was not done. 
In 17 CJS-Contracts, Sec. 31, page 359 the following 
statement of the law is found: 
"In order that there may be an agreement, the parties 
must have a distinct intention common to both and 
without doubt or difference. Until all understand 
alike there can be no assent and therefore no contract. 
Both parties must assent to the same thing in the 
same sense, and their minds must meet as to all 
the terms." 
It cannot be said in the instant case that the allegation 
of the complaint shows that the minds of appellants and 
respondents met as to all of the terms, the same thing in the 
same sense is not shown to have been agreed upon and no 
agreement is alleged which is not without doubt~ Not 
even the amount which appellants allege they were to pay 
was fixed with any certainty, they say it was approximately 
$1100.00. 
And in RCL on Contracts, Sec. 59, the law is stated: 
"An agreement to be binding must be sufficiently 
definite to enable the court to determine its exact 
meaning and fix definitely the legal liability of 
the parties." 
In 92 ALR at page 1403 it is said: 
"The courts have repeatedly held that it is an ele· 
mental and fundamental rule of law that a contract 
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to be valid 'must be certain and unequivocal in its 
essential terms, either within itself or by reference to 
some other agreement or matter' ". 
If the decision of this court on this point stands, it would 
mean that, thereby, the Trial Court would be required to 
supply those terms of the agreement, in fact the very agree-
ment which is not pleaded. The court should apply the 
above rule of law, particularly in this case, inasmuch as 
appellants would have the court impose a wholly oral con-
tingent fee agreement not favored in the law, and which 
does not recite essential parts. As was argued in our original 
brief, the allegation as to an oral agreement even if pleaded 
is entirely too indefinite and uncertain to constitute a con-
tract as against a motion for summary judgment. 
Cases of this nature, where a client engages and receives 
the services of an attorney, oftimes without paying for them, 
and then seeking damages in a lawsuit against him, for 
alleged omissions or commissions, based on meager, flimsy 
allegations of alleged oral negotiations, are outstanding 
examples of the justice of the rule above stated; for members 
of the Bar, by the very nature of their services, are likely 
prey to such litigants, and too often are limited in their 
defense to a mere verbal denial of the eager testimony of 
sometimes avaricious plaintiffs. 
Even if the allegation constituted an agreement made at 
its inception, then the consideration passing from appellants 
to respondents failed. Appellants contend that respondents 
were to perform the agreement within a prescribed period of 
time and that they failed to do so. Appellants presumably 
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were to pay approximately $100 within the same period of 
time, and this they failed to do. Appellants having failed to 
perform, why then should respondents be required to per-
form? This Court has said there was no time within which 
appellants were required to perform, but how does it appear 
that respondents knew appellants were intending to perform 
or would perform after the time within which respondents 
were to perform had expired? The fact is without contro-
versy that, at the expiration of the time within which re· 
spondents were required to perform, appellants had failed 
to perform their part of the agreement as alleged. 
It should be borne in mind that the allegation of the 
complaint does not state that resondents agreed to permit 
appellants to pay the approximately $100 whenever they 
saw fit, or at a time after the appeal period had expired, 
but appellants simply allege that respondents did not ask 
for said sum to be advanced then and there. Therefore, how 
can this Court find and determine from that pleading that 
appellants had a right to expect respondents to perform, 
when appellants had not performed, and further say that 
appellants could perform whenever they got good and ready 
to do so, if ever. There was a total failure of consideration 
and therefore no agreement. 
This court reads into the agreement terms and condi-
tions which are not there. In Bolen v. Parks, 308 P2d 521, 
(Cal. App.) it was held: 
"A court is not empowered to make for the parties to 
a transaction an agreement, which they did not see 
fit to make, and the function of the court is to ascer· 
tain and declare the nature of the transaction actually 
made." 
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And in Young v. Border Broadcasting Co., (Ariz.) 255 
P2d 888 the court said: 
"The court cannot make a contract for the parties but 
can only interpret them." 
Even where the court has adopted the rule that all pre-
sumptions must be in favor of the party against whom a 
summary judgment is entered, nevertheless the allegations of 
the complaint must contain all of the essential ingredients 
of a contract, and we respectfully submit that this complaint 
falls short of that requirement. If the decision of this court 
on this point stands, then this court will have read into the 
complaint essential elements which are not contained 
therein. 
Point II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETER-
MINING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT SHOW AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT 
HAVE RECOVERED HAD AN APPEAL BEEN PER-
FECTED. 
The decision of this court on this point, even under the 
rule pertaining to summary judgments, in effect reverses the 
long line of decisions handed down· by this court in which 
the court has held that on appeal in a will contest, the Su-
preme Court, could not disturb findings of the trial court 
if there was any competent evidence to support them. 
See In re Hanson's Estate, Utah, 52 P2d 1103, 
In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah, 410, 170 P. 452, 
In re LaMont's Estate, ((Utah), 79 P2d 652, 
In re Don Ling Ring's Estate, 78 U 324, 2 P2d 
902, 
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Goldberg v. Green, 95 U 379, 81 P2d 1106, 177 
ALR 1444, 
In re Ford's Estate, 70 U 456, 261 P. 15, 
In re Hansen's Will, 52 U 554, 177 P. 982, 
In re Hanson's Will, 50 U 207, 167 P. 256, 
In re Frandsen's Will, 50 U 156, 167 P. 362, 
Miller v Livingstone, 31 U 415, 88 P. 338. 
In the instant case the Trial Court, on the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, had before it the entire record of the 
Swan will case, which is all of the evidence that could have 
been considered by it, as a matter of law, had the case been 
before said court on the trial of the question of whether the 
Supreme Court would have reversed the Trial Court, as to 
Bridge, in the will case. Presumably that court fully con-
sidered that evidence, and decided that the Trial Court in 
the will case made the correct decision in the will case as 
to Bridge, just as it would have done if the question had been 
before it on the trial, instead of on a motion for summary 
judgment. There is no inherent evil in a summary judgment. 
It is a proper proceeding, provided by the Rules of Practice. 
In this case, it has the same effect as a judgment on the trial 
would have, as to this particular issue. How, then, can this 
court say that it must presume, because this is a motion for 
summary judgment, that the Supreme Court would have 
reversed the Trial Court as to Bridge, if an appeal had 
been taken in the will case. We respectfully submit that 
this is error. 
In re Alexander's Estate, (Utah), 139 P2d 432 this 
court said: 
"A will contest is an 'action at law' in which Supreme 
Court, on appeal, cannot weigh and pass on conflict-
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ing evidence, and can only determine whether there 
is substantial competent evidence to support trial 
court's findings and conclusions." The court cites 
many of the above cases in support of this statement. 
Now how does the court in a will case determine whether 
there is substantial competent evidence? In re Hanson's 
Estate supra the court said: 
"In a case of this sort it is not usually possible to 
procure direct evidence of the statements and conduct 
which one accused of undue influence has used on the 
decedent. The usual way is to give the surrounding 
circumstances from which deductions may be made." 
It must be presumed that the lower court in granting 
respondents' motion for summary judgment considered the 
whole record made in the court at the trial of the will case 
and not only that part of the record contained in the briefs 
filed herein. 
The trial court had the right and obligation to consider 
all of the evidence going to the health and general nervous 
condition of Miss Swan, not only in determining testamentary 
capacity but also to determine what sort of a subject the 
parties had to work on, as was the rule laid down by this court 
in re Hanson's Estate, supra in which the court said at page 
1117, 52 P2d: 
"In this case we have considerable doubt whether 
Marie did not have sufficient mental capacity to make 
a will. In some ways she appears to be quite intel-
ligent. Because of her physical deformity and lack 
of opportunity to live the life of a normal woman, 
she was shy, suspicious, sensitive, irritable, self-con-
scious, retiring, and uninterested in what people who 
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lead a normal life generally are. Coupled with these 
characteristics was a weak body and impaired nerv-
ous system, resulting in emotional instability and 
lack of control. Yet she longed for sympathy and to 
express herself, which led her frequently to seek 
company and conversation with others and to turn her 
interests to childlike occupations as well as to those 
things which gave her a refuge from herself and her 
repressions. The benefit of this doubt which we en-
tertain should he given to the findings of the trial 
court in its conclusion that Marie was incompetent to 
make a will. 
While there may he some doubt as to whether the 
decedent lacked testamentary capacity, there is no 
doubt but that it was a mind easily capable of being 
influenced. The evidence relating to Marie's men-
tality and general nervous control is therefore mate-
rial and of aid not only in determining testamentary 
capacity, but to determine what sort of subject Dr. 
McDonald had to play upon. A strong mind is not 
easily influenced. Therefore all the evidence of 
mentality and its strength or weakness is material on 
the issue of undue influence. The issue of undue in-
fluence involves two main lines of inquiry: ( 1) What 
type of person is it claimed was influenced? and (2) 
How or by what means was such person influenced?" 
It is argued by appellants that this court having already 
ruled that Miss Swan was not of unsound mind and that she 
did not lack testamentary capacity, it is conclusive that 
this court would have reversed the trial court in the original 
case had an appeal been perfected, hut this is not so. The 
trial court did determine, from all of the facts and evi-
dence before it and from its having had the opportunity 
to observe the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness 
stand, that testatrix had a mind which could he and was 
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influenced. The court made a finding as to same and 
therefore this court has the duty to review the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the findings. See Parrish v 
Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P2d 642 also we refer to 
Lawrence v Bamberger, 3 U 2d 247, 282 P2d 335 in which 
the court said: 
"Every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged 
in favor of validity and correctness of judgment 
under review, and it will not be disturbed unless 
appellant meets his burden of affirmatively show-
ing error." 
See also Rummell v Bailey, 7 U2d 137, 320 P2d 653; 
and Fleming v Fleming Felt Co., 7 U 2d 293, 323 P2d 
712 wherein the court said: 
"Where trial court found for the plaintiff, the Su-
preme Court on defendant's appeal reviewed the facts 
disclosed by the record in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff." 
See also Huber v Deep Creek lrr. Co. 6 U 2d 15, 305 
1'2d 478, Saunders v Spina (Colorado) 344 P2d 469. 
This court laid down a test as to mental capacity of a 
testator in re: Hanson's Estate, 87 U 580, 52 P2d 1103 in 
the following language: 
"The true test is as to whether the testatrix had 'suf-
ficient mind and memory (at the time of making the 
will) to remember who were the natural objects of 
her bounty, recall to mind her property, and dispose 
of it understandingly according to some plan formed 
in her mind'" citing Coleman v Marshall 263 Ill. 
330, 104 NE 1042. (Italics supplied) 
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It appears that the trial judge in the original will case 
did this very thing. He applied the test and found that the 
parties Wilda Gail Swan named to the doctors at the very 
time she made the codicil here in question were not named, 
and Ada Bridge, not having been mentioned to the doctors, 
was named, therefore the trial court found that the test 
' 
as given by this court in the Hansen case was not met. Thus 
the trial court placed the case squarely within that rule. 
There is no conflict in the evidence nor is there any contra-
dictory evidence as to this point. The finding of the court 
is amply supported by the evidence and still this Honorable 
Court now rules that the evidence before the trial court 
on the motion for summary judgment was not sufficient for 
the trial court to have granted respondent's motion. 
It is recognized that the decision of this court in the 
original appeal holding that Wilda Gail Swan did not lack 
testamentary capacity to make a will cannot be reversed 
in this case but we do contend most strenuously that the trial 
court in the original case could have found from the evidence 
and made its Conclusions of Law and judgment based on such 
finding that because of the mind of the subject which the 
parties had to work on Gail Swan could have been and was 
infl ue'nced in the making of the codicil under which Ada 
Bridge, whom Gail Swan did not mention to the doctors, was 
named as a beneficiary and that the codicil was not that of 
Gail Swan and did not carry out her desires. Such findings 
need not be supported by evidence that the testatrix was 
incompetent to make a will. Re Hanson's Estate supra. 
But such condition of mind may he considered when tht. 
question of influence exists. Under the cases hereinabove 
set out it may he presumed that the lower court in granting 
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respondent's motion for summary judgment concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court in the will 
contest case to have made such finding. 
There was competent evidence to support the conclu-
sions of the trial court and if this court is not persuaded 
that the conclusions are supported by direct evidence it is 
clearly evident then that the evidence is derived from "sense" 
facts as this court found and determined in the Hanson 
Estate case where the court said: 
"There cannot be any objection to conclusions of fact 
in findings if there is any competent evidence to sup-
port the conclusions. It is the business of the trial 
court to conclude from the basic competent testimony, 
certain facts, which would therefore necessarily be 
conclusions. They would in many cases, being 
ultimate or subultimate facts, necessarily be conclu · 
sions or inferences derived from what may be called 
'sense' facts; that is, facts derived from the testimony 
of witnesses based on the observations or use of the 
senses of such witnesses." 
We are mindful of the fact that the court in making the 
statement hereinabove quoted had under consideration the 
question of conclusions of a witness, still we say the law as 
therein given is applicable in the instant case. Especially 
is this true in the further statement by the court in the 
Hansen Estate case found on page 1108, 52 P2d as follows: 
"When the observation of the witness is over a long 
period of time, and the acts, conduct, or sayings of 
the person observed are many and perhaps trivial 
and of such a nature as to impress the mind of the 
observer with their continued insanity, but not suf-
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ficiently distinctive to impress the observer's mind 
with exactness or even with their content or meaning 
because of their general irrelevancy or incoherence, 
certain conclusions, if not too broad, would be per-
missible." 
It would be most difficult we think, to find two cases 
fitting the same pattern as closely as does the case of Hansen 
Estate and the Swan case. It does appear that this Honor-
able Court by its ruling here entirely disregards the rule 
of law given in the Hanson Estate case which rule appears 
to be that adopted by the courts of a majority of states, but 
on the contrary this decision in effect requires positive and 
direct evidence to be given in order to support the finding 
and conclusions of the trial court. We are not unmindful 
of the fact that the rule in most cases on motions for sum-
mary judgment requires that all presumptions are to be 
resolved in favor of the party against whom the motion is 
made, but we think the rule was not intended to be so broad 
as to carry such presumptions against the rule of law laid 
down by this court in Lawrence v Bamberger, supra. Espe· 
cially is this so when a full dress trial can add nothing to the 
record already made, which record was before the court at 
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. It seems 
that the purpose of summary judgment proceedings would be 
defeated if this were not the rule. 
In conclusion, we cannot believe that this court intended, 
by its determination of question number ( 3) of its decision 
herein, to predetermine the question therein set forth, and 
thereby virtually to preclude the Trial Court in this case from 
trying the issue of law as to whether, had the appeal been 
perfected in behalf of Ada Bridge, this court would have 
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found the bequest to Bridge void. However, unless this 
Honorable Court grants this Motion for Rehearing and 
reverses or modifies its decision in this regard, in our 
humble opinion the court below, out of the profound respect 
which it has and should have for this court's decisions, wil1 
likely construe the decision of this court as having predeter-
mined this question of law; leaving as the only issue to be 
determined by the Trial Court the existence of a contract and 
the alleged negligence of the defendants. This would consti-
tute grievous error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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